"Passmark" and similar authentication mechanisms are one of the best current solutions in use today. Unfortunately, Passmark is one of those mechanisms which are built to be broken. The strength of this authentication mechanism, in this care, depends on the number of images in the Passmark database which according to the website is currently at 50000.
50000 variations might be alright for now, but we would be short-sighted if we stop at this. One of the serious drawbacks of this mechanism is that if the user guesses the users logon name, or captures that information in some other way, Passmark authentication effectively reduces to a one-way password authentication.
For example, if an attacker wants to steal a victims session and has somehow guessed the users logon name, all they have to do under the "passmark mechanism" is to go to the real website once with the users logon name and extract the image shown by the real website. Once this is done, since the image doesn't change at all, ever, the attacker can prompt the victim with the cached image whenever the user logs on.
I think the day is not very far when companies like RSA will come out with two-way authentication mechanism where the token provided by the server keeps on changing. RSA already makes excellent two-factor one-way authentication, which changes based on time. They can easily extend it by doing a "two-way two-factor" authentication. If such a two-factor two-way authentication existed, even if the attacker knew victims logon name, he/she would have to go the real bank every time the user logs on, to get the latest SecureID token which the user could look for. Its just a mater of time after that for someone at the actual website to figure out phishing activity.
Before I end today's rant, I'd like to admit that its totally possible that someone has already done this, and that I've just not seen it yet. If so, I hope it gets deployed fast.